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BANKRUPTCY AND THE REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
I. Introduction
When a corporation becomes insolvent and faces bankruptcy, it may choose
one of two general methods of satisfying its creditors' demands. The first is liqui-
dation of corporate assets and subsequent distribution of the proceeds to the
creditors and shareholders, thereby resulting in dissolution of the enterprise. The
second, often less drastic, path is the corporate arrangement in bankruptcy.' The
corporation is not dissolved but continues operations under the direction of a
trustee appointed by a federal bankruptcy court.2 Instead of taking a share in
the sale of corporate assets at reduced value, creditors, in most instances, may
realize a greater monetary recovery in a reorganization since they share in the
going concern value of the business.' In a broader economic sense, the preser-
vation of corporate operations produces a beneficial, stabilizing effect in terms of
continuity in employment and production.
Despite the practical goals of a corporate arrangement, some complex legal
problems have developed with regard to a plan of corporate arrangement which
calls for substantial cutbacks in employment in order to lower costs and bring
about a faster recovery. This course of action is particularly problematic where
the trustee in bankruptcy or debtor-in-possession 4 rejects a collective bargaining
agreement pursuant to § 313 of the Bankruptcy Act.'
The central issue arises in the context of current labor law as embodied in
the Railway Labor Act (RLA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),'
dealing with the modification and protection of collective bargaining agreements:
1 11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970). Federal bankruptcy legislation is authorized by Article I,
Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the power to pass "uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." Chapters 9, 10, and 11 of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 deal with corporate reorganization and corporate arrangement in
bankruptcy. For discussion of the history and development of the notion of corporate re-
organization see Nassau Smelting & Refining Works, Ltd. v. Brightwood Bronze Foundry Co.,
265 U.S. 269 '(1924).
2 11 U.S.C. § 743 (1970). (Section 343 of the Bankruptcy Act). "The trustee is an
officer of the court. He is under the supervision and guidance of the court and accountable
to it for all his official acts and omissions." 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 70.43(5) (14th
ed. 1975).
3 See LEON S. FORMAN, Compositions, Bankruptcy and Arrangements (5th ed.), ABA-
ALl Bus. TRANS. (1971) [hereinafter cited as Forman]; and 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 2.07
(14th ed. 1975).
4 A "trustee in bankruptcy" and "debtor-in-possession" have practically identical functions.
They are appointed by the bankruptcy court to oversee the reorganization (in the case of the
trustee in bankruptcy) or the corporate arrangement of the bankrupt or debtor corporation
(in the case of a debtor-in-possession). Although corporate reorganization under Chapter 10
of the Bankruptcy Act and corporate arrangement in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 are distinct
proceedings, for purposes of this note they will be treated together as the issue of rejection of
collective bargaining agreements is equally relevant in both contexts.
5 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970). Section 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act provides:
Upon the filing of a petition, the court may, in addition to the jurisdiction,
powers, and duties conferred and imposed upon it by this chapter -
(1) permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor, upon notice
to the parties to such contracts and to such other parties in interest as the court
may designate.
6 Railway Labor Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. '(1970); and National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
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whether in the event of a corporate reorganization or arrangement under the
Bankruptcy Act, the trustee in bankruptcy must comply with provisions of the
RLA and NLRA before it may reject a collective bargaining agreement.
The areas which must be examined in order to respond to this complex
problem involve interpretation of statutory language, legislative history and case
law. An examinatlon of both the pertinent federal statutes which are at the
heart of the controversy, and an analysis of two recent court decisions, Shopmen's
Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc.' and Brotherhood of Rail-
way, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express,' will reveal one court's
method of dealing with this issue. The nature of the collective bargaining agree-
ment and its relation to the Bankruptcy Act will then be discussed from the
perspective of legislative history and judicial interpretation. Finally, a detailed
scrutiny of the policy considerations inherent in the issue will aid a fuller under-
standing and suggest the need for a more workable solution for both the bank-
rupt corporation and the union worker.
II. Statutory Framework of the Controversy
A. The Bankruptcy Act
According to § 313 of the Bankruptcy Act, a federal bankruptcy court may
"permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor, upon notice to the
parties to such contracts and to such other parties in interest as the court may
designate."9 Traditionally, the courts have allowed trustees in bankruptcy to
reject executory contracts which are onerous or burdensome to the bankrupt in
order to provide for a more effective and efficient reorganization and recovery.
This privilege has been interpreted to include the rejection of collective bar-
7 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). Kevin Steel involved a collective bargaining agreement
entered into between Shopmen's Local Union No. 455, organized under provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act and Kevin Steel Products, Inc.. a steel fabricator and erector.
The corporation filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act and was appointed
debtor-in-possession to operate the corporation under the bankruptcy court's supervision
during corporate arrangement proceedings. Kevin Steel, as debtor-in-possession, petitioned the
bankruptcy court for permission to reject, as an onerous executory contract, the collective
bargaining agreement in force with the labor union. The bankruptcy court granted the
petition, but the union pressed an appeal. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York reversed the bankruptcy court's order and held that the power of the bankruptcy
court to relieve a debtor from the burdens of any executory contract did not apply to collective
bargaining agreements, 381 F. Supp. 336, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The debtor then appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
8 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975). In this case, the two collective bargaining agreements
in question were entered into under the Railway Labor Act between the Brotherhood of Railway,
Airline and Steamship Clerks (BRAC), the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM) and REA Express, Inc., a corporation engaged in the surface and
air transport of express shipments. REA filed a petition under Chapter 11 and was appointed
debtor-in-possession of its property. The agreements governed the wages and working con-
ditions and substantially affected REA's right to close or consolidate facilities and transfer
or lay off workers. REA petitioned the court for an order permitting rejection of the two
collective bargaining agreements as onerous and burdensome. The bankruptcy court denied
the petition. The U.S. District Court for the Southern -District of New York reversed. The
District Court found the collective bargaining agreements to be onerous and burdensome and
concluded there existed no limitation on the type of executory contract which a trustee or
debtor-in-possession was permitted to reject under § 313(1). The union took its appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
9 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970).
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gaining agreements as executory contracts. ° Without an opportunity to reject
an executory contract, a bankrupt corporation may be unable to continue oper-
ation and would be forced to liquidate.
B. The RLA and NLRA
The RLA and NLRA, however, forbid unilateral rejection of collective
bargaining by either management or labor." Both acts require that specific
procedures be followed when a labor agreement is sought to be modified during
its term. For example, § 8(d) of the NLRA 2 provides that no party to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement shall "terminate or modify it" unless the party desiring
such termination or modification:
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract...
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party...;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service... and simul-
taneously therewith notifies any state or Territorial agency established to
mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory.. ;
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout,
all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days
after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, which-
ever occurs later. .. Js
Section 6 of the RLA contains similar requirements and emphasizes that the
collective bargaining agreement sought to be terminated or modified "shall not
be altered... until the controversy has been finally acted upon."'1 4
The conflict between two major areas of federal law is readily apparent.
The Bankruptcy Act provides for the summary rejection of executory contracts,
including labor agreements, while conversely, the RLA and NLRA mandate
adherence to certain procedures of mediation and renegotiation before a collec-
tive bargaining agreement may be terminated. Moreover, these labor law pro-
visions, like the Bankruptcy Act provisions, seek to implement an important
policy: the preservation of industrial peace.
III. Recent Developments-Kevin Steel and REA Express
Whether § 313 was intended to authorize or should authorize the rejection
of collective bargaining agreements as executory contracts has produced recent
10 See In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); 8 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 11 3.15(1) (14th ed. 1975); and 4A COLLIER ON BANxRUPTCy' 70.43(2)
(14th ed. 1975). See also In re American R. Co. of Porto Rico, 110 F. Supp. 45 (D.C.
Puerto Rico 1952); and In re Public Ledger, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
11 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(a) (5) and (d) (Supp. 1976); and 45 U.S.C. §§ 155 and 156(1970).
12 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (Supp. 1976).
13 Id.
14 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1970).
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litigation. In Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc. 5
and Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express,16
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for the first time grappled with the problem
of rejection of collective bargaining agreements in corporate arrangement pro-
ceedings. The court concluded in both cases that § 313 of the Bankruptcy Act
clearly allows the rejection of collective bargaining agreements during a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. However, recognizing the policy considerations behind the
NLRA and the RLA of protecting labor agreements, the court held in Kevin
Steel that the bankruptcy court must move cautiously in allowing rejection of
labor contracts." And, in REA Express, the court held that the rejection of the
labor agreement must clearly be the "lesser of two evils--that unless the labor
contract is rejected, the bankrupt company will collapse."' 8 Clearly, the Second
Circuit attempted to reach an equitable compromise between allowing summary
rejection of collective bargaining agreements in corporate reorganization under
§ 313 and permitting rejection or modification of the labor contract only in
accordance with elaborate and time-consuming procedures outlined in the NLRA
and RLA.9
In reaching both holdings, the Second Circuit emphasized that a collective
bargaining agreement came within the § 313 language of "executory contracts
of the debtor 20 and in each case found that the Bankruptcy Act provisions took
precedence over RLA and NLRA provisions for modification of collective bar-
gaining agreements. The court skirted the problem of reconciling the conflicting
statutory provisions present in the Bankruptcy Act and the NLRA. It concluded
that under the Bankruptcy Act a bankrupt corporation becomes an entirely new
corporate entity when it enters into an arrangement in bankruptcy because con-
trol is transferred from the original shareholders to the court and the bankrupt's
creditors.2' The court reasoned that NLRA and RLA provisions pertaining to
modification or rejection of labor agreements do not apply to a debtor-in-pos-
session because as a "new juridical entity" it is not a party to the original collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Hence, it is neither bound by the contract's terms
nor by the provisions of the NLRA or RLA regarding modification.22
In REA Express, the court ignored the union's claim that labor agreements
entered into under the RLA were exempted from rejection under § 313 by §
77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act which provides that "no judge or trustee acting
under this (Act) shall change the wages or working conditions of railroad em-
ployees except in the manner prescribed in (the Railway Act). "" The court
held that this exception must be interpreted strictly and applies only to collective
bargaining agreements of "railroad employees." Although the RLA has been
15 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
16 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975).
17 519 F.2d at 707.
18 523 F.2d at 172.
19 See note 11, supra.
20 See note 5, supra.
21 Forman, supra note 3, at 3.
22 519 F.2d at 704.
23 11 U.S.C. § 205r(n) (1970).
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extended to cover labor contracts of airline and other transportation workers, 4
by statute and case law the court determined that § 77 (n) of the Bankruptcy Act
could not be similarly expanded.
IV. Is a Collective Bargaining Agreement An
"Executory Contract" Within § 313?
Kevin Steel and REA Express approved a broad reading of § 313 of the
Bankruptcy Act that would include collective bargaining agreements. Since, how-
ever, the Bankruptcy Act provided for the rejection of executory contracts long
before the collective bargaining agreement became a major part of American
industry,2 it is arguable that Congress considered only the rejection of traditional
commercial contracts when it passed this provision. The interpretation of § 313
must be examined on the basis of case law and legislative history to determine
the propriety of the broad scope attributed to it by the Second Circuit.
A. The Cases
1. Expansive Interpretation of § 313-Klaber Bros.
The sparse case precedent considering this problem generally indicates that
collective bargaining agreements are within the ambit of § 313,6 except where
the only purpose of the reorganization or arrangement proceeding is to avoid a
collective bargaining agreement. 7 This notion of § 313 rejection power was
initially developed in In re Klaber Bros., Inc.,"9 where a debtor-in-possession
moved to reject a collective bargaining agreement entered into between the
bankrupt and the union. A union representative testified at the referee's hearing
that continued adherence to the collective bargaining agreement would injure
the bankrupt financially. Therefore, the union offered to make certain conces-
sions to alleviate the burden on the bankrupt corporation, but the referee dis-
regarded these concessions and rejected the29 collective bargaining agreement.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that the Referee's order of rejection was sound on the ground that "the
Bankruptcy Act makes no distinction among classes of executory contracts. The
power to permit rejection of an executory contract should be exercised where re-
jection is to the advantage of the estate.""0 Citing no case precedent or basis in
24 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-85 (1970); See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines,
372 U.S. 682 (1963); In re Overseas Nat'1 Airways, Inc. 238 F. Supp. 359 '(E.D.N.Y.
1965); and Manning v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 221 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) aff'd 329 F.2d
32 (2d Cir.) cert, denied. 379 U.S. 817 (1964).
25 The collective bargaining agreement gained federal statutory recognition with the
passage of the RLA in 1926 and the NLRA in 1935. Since the early 1900's the Bankruptcy
Act has recognized rejection of executory contracts in the forerunner of reorganization - the
composition proceeding in bankruptcy. For a fuller discussion of this provision see Countryman,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 MiNN. L. Rev. 479 (1974).
26 See note 10, supra.
27 Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters Loc. No. 886 v. Quick Charge, 168 F.2d 513 (10th
Cir. 1948); and In re Mamie Conti Gowns, 12 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
28 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
29 Id. at 85.
30 8 COLLmR ON BANKRUPTCY 3.15(8) '(14th ed. 1975).
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legislative history, the court based its decision solely on bankruptcy treatise ma-
terial." On this same authority, it held that the union's offer to make concessions
was not permissible since "an executory contract cannot be rejected in part, and
assumed in part." The opinion shed little light on why the court felt § 313
embraced the labor contract.
2. The Effect of Labor Legislation on § 313
In Carpenter's Local 2746 v. Turney Wood Products, Inc., 2 a federal dis-
trict court focused on a finding of no apparent conflict between the NLRA and
the Bankruptcy Act in dismissing a suit brought by a labor union challenging the
rejection of its collective bargaining agreement by a trustee in bankruptcy under
§ 313. Although the union and the court agreed that collective bargaining agree-
ments were executory and therefore of the type included under § 313, the union
argued that federal labor legislation had "so preempted the field as to take the
collective bargaining agreement out of the scope" of § 313. The court, however,
bolstered the Klaber Bros. holding further by insisting:
Neither labor legislation of the Congress nor the Bankruptcy Act contains
any language which would generally exclude collective bargaining agree-
ments from . . . [rejection under § -313]. Had Congress desired that there
be such general exclusion, it would have said so.33
It is evident that the case law dealing with § 313 is tenuously based on a
reading of Congressional silence and treatise law. Both of the courts above chose
a literal interpretation of § 313 and failed to recognize that there exists a direct
conflict between the language of that section and sections 8(a) (5) and (d) of
the NLRA. Section 8(a) (5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. Section
8(d) of the NLRA defines the § 8(a) (5) duty to bargain collectively as mean-
ing that no party to a collective bargaining agreement shall "terminate or modify
it" unless the party desiring such termination or modification complies with the
notice and mediation procedures set out in this section. 4
3. The Legislative History and the Turney Wood Decision
While it is evident that Congress in the RLA and NLRA did not specifically
provide for special procedures in the event of bankruptcy, it is readily apparent
that Congress condones the modification of collective bargaining agreements only
after resort to mediation procedures during which the labor agreement remains
31 173 F. Supp. at 85. The court cited 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY II 3.15(7) (14th ed.
1975).
32 289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
33 Id. at 149.
34 See note 11, supra.
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in full force and effect.8 5
An examination of the legislative history of the NLRA shows that § 8(d),
enacted in 1947, is absolute on its face and that there is no mention of Con-
gressional intent to limit its application by operation of the Bankruptcy Act. The
courts in interpreting § 313 as allowing the rejection of collective bargaining
agreements force the union to accept rejection of its agreement contrary to §
8 (d). The courts are permitting a bankrupt corporation to accomplish indirectly
what it could not accomplish directly without violating the NLRA or the RLA.
It is doubtful that Congress would have specified how collective bargaining
should be treated in the Bankruptcy Act since the notion of rejection of execu-
tory contracts was incorporated in federal bankruptcy law long before the labor
contract came into existence.80 It is also significant that the problem of rejection
of labor agreements in corporate reorganization, or arrangement has only infre-
quently and recently resulted in litigation. 37
B. The Unique Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
The unique legal nature of the collective bargaining agreement also dictates
that it not be included within § 313. Section 313 speaks of rejection of "execu-
tory contracts" of the debtor.8 ' An executory contract is usually defined as a
contract wherein the contractual duties have not been substantially performed
by the contracting parties. 9 In the corporate arrangement setting, the courts
have generally allowed rejection of executory contracts of the bankrupt where
rejection was to its financial advantage.," Although § 313 ordinarily operates to
allow rejection of contracts for goods and services, the provision, as indicated
above, has been interpreted by various writers to include labor contracts.41 This
extension is questionable, however, in light of the basic differences between an
executory contract for goods or services and a collective bargaining agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement is a unique type of legal undertaking
in both its form and history. Created to solve the growing problems of labor
unrest during the 1930's, these contracts have become the accepted mode of
ordering the employment relationship between labor and corporate management.
The passage of the Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act
manifested congressional interest in the preservation of industrial peace through
collective bargaining and the arbitration of grievances.4
35 Id. In Manning v. American Airlines, the Court explained § 156 of the RLA:
Congress has forbidden a change by defendant of 'rates of pay. rules, or working
conditions' during the processes required by the Act. Congress believed that labor
peace in the air carrier industry would be promoted by maintaining the status quo
while efforts were being made to reach agreement. ...
221 F. Supp. 301, 306 (S.DN.Y. 1963) af'd 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1964) cert. denied 379
U.S. 817 (1964).
36 See Countryman, supra note 25, at 553.
37 "We recognize that there appear to be no appellate decisions squarely on point. The
issue [in Kevin Steell . . . has -not been litigated frequently." 519 F.2d at 703.
38 11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970).
39 Countryman, supra note 25, at 498. See also, Countryman, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MrNN. L. Ray. 439, (1973).
40 See note 30, supra.
41 See note 10, supra.




The labor agreement differs from the commercial contract in several respects.
Indeed, prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the collective bargaining
agreement was not perceived as a "contract."43 Furthermore, a lack of volun-
tariness permeates the collective bargaining framework. The collective bar-
gaining agreement was conceived by Congress to be the fruit of negotiation and
necessary compromise between labor and corporate management as to rates of
pay, rules and working conditions. In many instances, compromise is necessary
since the corporate employer and the labor union bargain in an essentially "closed
market," having only each other to bargain with.44 This lack of voluntariness is
the exception rather than the rule in the commercial context.
Most significantly, the collective bargaining agreement concerns workers'
jobs and employment status while the commercial contract deals with manu-
factured goods and land. For these reasons and because the collective bargaining
agreement did not exist when the Bankruptcy Act first allowed rejection of
executory contracts that the application by the courts of §313 to all "classes of
executory contracts" regardless of their nature needs to be more critically exam-
ined. While the Bankruptcy Act clearly allows for the rejection of executory
contracts of a commercial nature, persuasive argument can be made that due
to the unique nature of the collective bargaining agreement, § 313 should not
supersede provisions in the NLRA and RLA dealing with changes in wages,
rules, and working conditions.
V. Sections 77 and 272 of the Bankruptcy Act and Labor Agreements
A. The NLRA and § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act
The Bankruptcy Act does not ignore collective bargaining agreements en-
tirely. Section 77(n)4 ' prohibits bankruptcy courts and trustees in bankruptcy
from interfering with collective bargaining agreements entered into under the
Railway Labor Act, while § 272 prohibits interference by the bankruptcy court
and trustee in bankruptcy with workers' rights to form and join labor unions.46
While these provisions indicate an intent to specially treat the collective
bargaining agreements existing in federal labor legislation, the courts, as in Kevin
Steel, have narrowly interpreted § 77(n) to apply only to agreements entered
into under the RLA. In doing so, the Court has confronted the perplexing ques-
43 Chamberlain. Collective Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 CoLuM. L. REv.
829, 832 '(1948); and Note. Corporate Reorganizations and the Rights of Labor, 53 HARv.
L. Rv. 1360, 1363-64 (1940).
44 A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-
government. When most parties enter into contractual relationship, they do so
voluntarily, in the sense that there is no real compulsion to deal with one another,
as opposed to dealing with other parties. This is not true of the labor agreement.
The choice is generally not between entering or refusing to enter into a relationship.
... Rather it is between having that relationship governed by an agreed upon rule
of law or leaving each and every matter subject to a temporary resolution dependent
solely upon the relative strength, at any given moment, of the contending forces.
United Steelworkers of American v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580
(1960).
45 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1970).
46 11 U.S.C. § 672 (1970).
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tion of whether congressional silence as to agreements under the NLRA (NLRA
labor agreements are not mentioned in the Bankruptcy Act) are to be treated
differently from those under the RLA which enjoy the protection of § 77 (n).
The lower district court in Kevin Steel examined whether the apparent lack
of exclusionary language in the Bankruptcy Act as to collective bargaining agree-
ments under NLRA was intentional or mere oversight by Congress. The lower
court opted for an explanation of congressional oversight in interpreting the
intent behind the § 77 exception. The court found that as between the policies
of the Bankruptcy Act and the National Labor Relations Act, Congress intended
labor policies to prevail "so that the debtor-in-possession... should not have been
permitted to reject a collective bargaining agreement where the provisions of
the (NLRA) were not followed.""7 The lower court reasoned that Congress in-
tended that all labor contracts be treated similarly regardless of whether they
were entered into under the RLA or NLRA.'
The Second Circuit, in reversing the lower court, interpreted § 77(n)
literally, viewing Congressional silence as to the exclusion of NLRA labor agree-
ments from the reach of § 313 to mean that these agreements could be rejected
because § 77 only applied to labor contracts under the RLA.
Although not based on literal interpretation of § 313 or § 77(n), the lower
court's view seems to be a better, if not more logical, reading of congressional
silence-namely, that such silence was oversight. Certainly, it is doubtful that
Congress would create a great distinction between the treatment of labor con-
tracts under the RLA and labor agreements under the NLRA. Because, how-
ever, the legislative history of § 77 (n) is equivocal in nature, the Second Circuit
in Kevin Steel found that congressional silence indicated § 77(n) was confined
to agreements entered into only under the RLA; 4s the section was passed as part
of the Railroad Reorganization Act of 1934. This legislation provided an alter-
native to equity receivership for the nation's bankrupt railroads. Since the Bank-
ruptcy Act was passed after the RLA but before enactment of the NLRA, the
use of the limited language "railroad employees" in § 313 is not surprising.
Although at the time of its passage it clearly applied only to agreements under
the RLA, the measure can be read as manifesting congressional intent to protect
labor agreements from rejection without resort to statutory provisions for its
modification. While, then, it is possible for the congressional silence to be read
in either fashion,50 the Second Circuit in Kevin Steel held that § 77(n) could
not be extended by analogy to agreements under the NLRA.
47 Shopmen's Local Union No. 445 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 336(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
48 Id. at 338.
49 Senator Wheeler explained various oversights in legislative drafting of the Railroad
Reorganization Act during Senate debate: "The Senate may remember that the original
section 77 of the bankruptcy law was passed by Senate hurriedly, and almost without
debate. . . ." 79 CoNG. REc. 13764 (1935). However, the Congressional debates of 1933
show a conscious effort to protect labor agreements. Senator LaGuardia remarked: "Labor is
fully protected by the specific provision that nothing in the bill be construed as in any way
amendinq or altering the provisions of the railway labor act. It was thought necessary to put
this provision in because in some instances equity receivers have disregarded the provisions of
the RLA and have arbitrarily reduced the wage scale." 76 CONG. REan. 2927 (1933).
50 519 F.2d at 705.
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B. Limiting § 77(n) to "Railroad Employees"
In REA Express where the labor contract in question was governed by the
Railway Labor Act, the Second Circuit went even further in limiting the appli-
cability of § 77(n). The court found that § 77(n) applied only to those collec-
tive bargaining agreements entered into by "railroad employees."'" The court
thus drew an even finer distinction between different types of labor agreements,
and determined that § 77(n) does not apply to all contracts under RLA but
only to those of railroad employees. The court reasoned that if the reorganizing
bankrupt corporation was forced to comply with the time-consuming mediation
and negotiation provisions present in the RLA, the union would be defeating its
own purpose. The corporation may not have been able to survive financially and
still maintain the status quo during negotiations.
The Second Circuit's limitation of § 77(n) represents a myopic view of
subsequent congressional policy which encourages collective bargaining and
adherence to labor agreements in all types of business and industry. The notion
that statutory interpretation is not limited to precise words such as "railroad
employees" was adopted by the Supreme Court in Boys Market v. Retail Clerks
Union." In resolving a question of statutory interpretation' under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the Court stated:
[s]tatutory interpretation requires more than concentration upon isolated
words; rather consideration must be given to the total corpus of pertinent
law and the policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions. 3
It is evident that the Second Circuit formulated an unwarranted narrow
interpretation of § 77 (n) for if it had considered congressional policy subsequent
to the passage of the Railroad Reorganization Act, it would have found con-
vincing indicia of congressional protection of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.5
4
Furthermore, the Kevin Steel and REA Express decisions present an interest-
ing twist of statutory interpretation. In Kevin Steel the Court in interpreting
§ 77 (n) explains that agreements entered into under the NLRA do not enjoy
the same treatment in bankruptcy proceedings as those entered into under the
RLA. The court emphasizes that these two types of agreements are distinct with
51 523 F.2d at 170.
52 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In Nat'l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 '(1967),
rehearing denied 387 U.S. 926 (1967), the Supreme Court stressed the "familiar rule that a
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers." Id. at 619. That principle has par-
ticular application in the construction of labor legislation which is "to a marked degree, the
result of conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held views on
the role of organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate balance
to be struck between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their respective
interests." Id.
53 398 U.S. at 250.
54 The chronology of congressional action: 1926-Railway Labor Act (RLA), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970); 1934 - Railway Reorganization Act incorporating § 77(n)
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205 "(1970); 1935-National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970); 1938-Chandler Amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207 (1970); and 1947-Taft-Hartley Amendment (Labor Man-
agement Relations Act). 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
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regard to § 77 (n). In REPA Express the court ignores the Kevin Steel distinction
and proceeds to carve out an even finer classification. The court found that only
labor contracts entered into by "railroad employees" enjoy the protection of
§ 77(n). Thus, the decisions taken together show that the controlling distinction
is not to be made on the basis of whether the labor agreement comes under RLA
or NLRA but rather on whether the labor union is comprised of "railroad em-
ployees" or nonrailroad employees; a tenuous result at best.
VI. Avoidance of the Labor Law Provisions
A. The "New Entity" Concept
Although the court in Kevin Steel and REA Express secondarily relied on
§ 77(n), it did not base its holding on the narrow interpretation of that section.
Instead, the court found that because a bankrupt corporation in an arrangement
or reorganization becomes a new corporate entity, it is not therefore bound to the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement entered into between the old corporate
entity and the union.55 The court's characterization of the "new entity" status
of a corporation undergoing reorganization or arrangement is technically correct.
This basic principle of bankruptcy law is based on the notion that a debtor in
bankruptcy be afforded a "fresh start" after satisfying its previous creditors'
demands in bankruptcy proceedings. As an entirely new entity in the eyes of the
law, the debtor-in-possession such as in Kevin Steel or REA Express can escape
the reach of the NLRA and RLA contract modification provisions since these
statutes apply to the "parties" to the collective bargaining agreement.
B. A Critical Examination of the "New Entity" Rationale
Although the Second Circuit's conceptualization is legally sound, in some
instances pragmatism dictates that the "new entity" concept is only a legal fiction
adopted for convenience in dealing with a complex problem. 6 For instance, in
both Kevin Steel and REA Express the debtor corporation was appointed as
debtor-in-possession to supervise the corporate arrangement of its own enterprise.
Although the debtor-in-possession takes upon itself the task of reaching agree-
ment with the creditors and revising operations in order to best satisfy creditors'
claims, the managers and the workers of the debtor corporation remained essen-
55 519 F.2d at 704.
56 An example of this fiction can be found in NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128
F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1942) where unfair labor practices had been committed by the respondent
while it acted as debtor-in-possession of its business during a bankruptcy reorganization. The
NLRB petitioned for enforcement of its order against the -debtor-in-possession. The Court
stated: [It will hardly be denied that a debtor-in-possession is responsible for the unfair labor
practices which occur during a reorganization. Its status as an employer is no
different, so far as the NLRA . .. is concerned than that of any other employer....
And where managerial control and economic interest of the debtor-in-possession and
the reorganized company are the same, it could be only the blindness of formalism
that would suggest separately instituted proceedings against the predecessor and the
successor for the redress of their respective but continuous unfair labor practice.Id. at 43.
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tially identical. Heretofore, the relationship between the two groups was gov-
erned by a collective bargaining agreement wrought of negotiation and com-
promise. Under the Second Circuit's "new entity" rationale, the corporation may
at any time repudiate the collective bargaining by operation of § 313 although
the union members are working at their same jobs and for the same management
as in prebankruptcy times.
VII. Policy Considerations Involved with the "New Entity" Rationale
Because the process of corporate reorganization or arrangement can be
abused by a "new entity" seeking only to rid itself of a collective bargaining
agreement without regard to whether such rejection was necessary, the Second
Circuit tempered the effect of its analysis by emphasizing several relevant policy
considerations which had to be balanced in the rejection decision. In so doing,
the court did not solely rely on technical legal reasoning but considered the prac-
tical realities present on each side of the rejection issue. An examination of the
policy considerations will serve to introduce the new standards set out by the
court.
A. The Employee Perspective
The court in both Kevin Steel and REA Express was cognizant of the policy
implications of its decision with respect to workers' rights. In both cases, the
court was influenced by an earlier decision, In re Overseas National Airways,
Inc." in which a federal district court refused to allow the summary rejection
of a collective bargaining agreement between an airline workers' union and an
airline undergoing corporate reorganization in bankruptcy. In that case, the
court was concerned about the unrecoverable losses employees might suffer if
rejection were allowed without a substantial showing of necessity on the part of
the bankrupt. Namely, the court felt that seniority, insurance and other fringe
benefits which workers had acquired over the years and which were included
in their labor contracts would be lost by the employees. It was evident to the
Overseas National Airways court that the worker could lose everything if the
corporation went into corporate reorganization or arrangement and the bank-
ruptcy courts allowed rejection of collective bargaining agreements. The worker
faced cuts in wages, relocation, loss of seniority credits and possible loss of his
job."
The injustice is enhanced by the fact that the corporate bankruptcy may
have been caused by irresponsible financial management of the bankrupt by the
company officers and managers over which the union has no control. Supreme
Court Justice Douglas in his dissent in Joint Industry Board v. United States9
expressed the need for affording "special protection to a class of wage-earners who
generally have no substantial savings or other reserves to fall back on in case of
adversity and therefore cannot afford to lose [their rights under a collective bar-
57 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
58 Id. at 361-62.




In addition to the foregoing enumeration of possible hardships faced by the
employee in the event the debtor-in-possession is allowed to reject the collective
bargaining agreement, the worker's legal remedies against a bankrupt are severely
limited. If the collective bargaining agreement is rejected in reorganization or
arrangement proceedings, the employees have three basic means of recourse.
First, when a trustee in bankruptcy rejects an executory contract, it is considered
a breach of contract and the union may attempt to prove a claim for damages.
If the claim is proven, the union is deemed a general creditor of the bankrupt and
would not be satisfied until after the preferred creditors."' Second, § 206 of the
Bankruptcy Act provides that "[t]he judge may for cause shown permit a labor
union or employees' association... to be heard on the economic soundness of the
plan affecting the interests of the employees."8 2 Although this provision allows
the union to request participation in the formulation of a reorganization plan,
whether the union could appeal as to the workability or fairness of the plan
adopted by the creditors is not clear. 3 The third alternative is economic coercion
through a union strike of its bankrupt employer. Although this action may be
effective in an ordinary labor context, the strike may likely be self-defeating in
the bankruptcy context where the economic hardship could force the employer
into liquidation.
B. The Corporation's Dilemma
Policy considerations favoring organized labor which moved the Second
Circuit to refuse to allow summary rejection of collective bargaining agreement
had to be balanced against those favoring the fast and efficient rehabilitation of
bankrupt corporations. From a debtor-in-possession's perspective, requiring every
bankrupt corporation to assume its collective bargaining agreements during
reorganization and adhere to the negotiation and mediation requirements out-
lined in the NLRA and RLA could seriously undermine the reorganization in
terms of time consumed and financial hardship. A debtor-in-possession such as
Kevin Steel might find itself hamstrung by terms of a labor contract which would
preclude it from making necessary cutbacks in the work force, closing unprofitable
plant facilities, or making wage reductions. Moreover, unrealistic wage terms in
the collective bargaining agreement might force the bankrupt into a serious
liquidity problem forestalling payment to creditors and thereby prolonging the
arrangement process.
VIII. Analysis of the New Standard
In light of these significant policy considerations the Second Circuit tem-
pered the harsh effect of its interpretation of § 313 with certain standards which
had to be met on remand before the bankruptcy court could approve rejection.
In Kevin Steel, the court called for a thorough scrutiny of the benefits and draw-
60 Id. at 232.
61 Teton, Reorganization Revised, 48 YALxz L. J. 573, 595-96 (1939); and Comment,
Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42 So. CAL. L. Rnv., 477, 486 (1969).
62 11 U.S.C. 9 606 '(1970).
63 See, e.g., 6A COLLmR O N BANKRUPTCY 9.24 (14th ed. 1975).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
backs of rejection requiring a balancing of the equities on both sides.64 In REA
Express, the court stated that rejection of the collective bargaining agreement
must be clearly "the lesser of two evils.., unless the agreement is rejected, the
carrier will collapse."65 The Kevin Steel language is considerably weaker because
of its vagueness. It must be remembered that in actual practice, it is the bank-
ruptcy court which will apply the standard. Since this court's main function is
to oversee the efficient administration of the Bankruptcy Act, it can be argued
that the court may be unduly sympathetic to the "equities" favoring the debtor-
in-possession.
The test set forth in REA Express, on the other hand, requires the debtor-in-
possession or trustee to show that the collective bargaining agreement is so onerous
that adherence will lead to liquidation in bankruptcy. At the same time, the
court recognizes that retention of the labor agreement cannot be condoned at
the expense of total failure of the business. This test thus possibly strikes a work-
able compromise between the policies of the NLRA and RLA and the Bankrupt-
cy Act. The new standard takes into account the unique nature of the collective
bargaining agreement as an embodiment of tangible and intangible human rights.
Although the test does not require deference to the modification provisions of
the RLA or NLRA, it requires a positive showing on the part of the bankrupt
that rejection is the only alternative to complete liquidation-a burden of proof
which protects the collective bargaining agreement and recognizes the importance
of maintaining its stability in order to preserve industrial peace. With regard to
the important policies of the Bankruptcy Act, the REA Express standard does not
preclude or hinder corporate reorganization or arrangement with cumbersome
or time-consuming procedures.
IX. Conclusion-Need for Congressional Clarification
Although the Second Circuit has set forth a well-reasoned compromise be-
tween the two areas of federal legislation, a more definitive solution can only
be created through congressional action.
Since the law in this controversy is based on statutory provisions passed by
Congress in the 1930's, it is highly likely that congressional silence as to whether
labor agreements come within the reach of § 313 is due to the dearth of litigation
on the question. In the face of the increasing importance of the collective bar-
gaining agreement and the number of corporations choosing reorganization or
arrangement over liquidation, Congress should fashion an amendment to § 313
whereby labor agreements are assumed by the trustee or debtor-in-possession
and onerous terms can be renegotiated within a time frame appropriate to an
expedient arrangement or reorganization plan. Not only would such a law reduce
the confusion and burden placed upon the bankruptcy court in determing the
"lesser of two evils," it would also strike a clear and definitive balance between
two areas of law vital to the ordered growth of American business and industry.
Patricia S. Higgins
64 519 F.2d at 707.
65 523 F.2d at 172.
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